Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about their endowment. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the rest of them are likely to declare a lower-than-actual endowment to the responders. In the second part of the paper, we report on an experiment testing this game. On average, 88.5% of the proposers understate the actual endowment by 20.5%. Regression analysis shows that a one-dollar gap between the actual and declared amounts prompts proposers to reduce their offer by 19 cents. However, responders appear not to take such claims seriously, and thus the frequency of rejections should increase. The consequence is a net welfare loss, that is specific to such a "free-to-lie" environment.
Introduction
Humans sometimes resort to lies as a tool for leveraging on negotiation power (e.g., Lewicki, 1983; Anton, 1990; Shapiro and Bies, 1994) . As noted by Lewicki and Stark (1996, p.77) , in a negotiation context, "lies misinform the opponent, eliminate or obscure the opponent choice alternatives, or manipulate the perceived costs and benefits of particular choice options open to the opponent". Clearly, in a world entirely populated by liars, messages would not be taken seriously by their recipients. 1 The ability of these less ethical people to manipulate the beliefs of others is therefore grounded in the existence of at least some individuals who have a significant aversion to lying (Kartik et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Kartik, 2009 ).
There is a growing body of experimental economics literature on lying and deception that focuses on what motivates individuals to resort to such questionable communication methods. In this context, players are generally referred to as the Sender (of the message) and the Receiver. Gneezy (2005) submits an interesting typology of lies with respect to players' payoffs. If the lie, defined as a misrepresentation of reality, brings about an improvement in both players' well-being, we have a "Pareto white lie"; if the sender is worse-off but the receiver is better-off, we have "an altruistic white lie". If the sender is better-off while the receiver is worse-off, this is the typical "selfish lie", which Gneezy (2005) acknowledges to be the most relevant category for many economic events. Taking stock from a two-person interaction experiment, he shows that a non-negligible number of subjects lie in order to reap some benefit, even if this involves a loss for their partner in the game; subjects' inclination to lie increases the more they have to gain from the lie, and decreases the more the others will lose from it. 1 Pioneering studies in the analysis of strategic information manipulation were submitted by Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Sobel (1985) . In these papers agents can send misleading messages without a direct cost, i.e. they can undertake "cheap talk". In equilibrium, the messages do no alter the action of the receiver.
One important finding of these empirical studies is that humans inherently present some form of aversion to lying, although its extent can vary greatly from one individual to another. Lundquist et al. (2009) find that aversion to lying increases with the size of the lie. Erat and Gneezy (2011) show that a majority of people are reluctant to tell even Pareto white lies, which suggests that lie aversion is independent of any social preference over outcomes. Hurkens and Kartick (2009) argue that some people might never lie and others would lie whenever they prefer the outcome of lying to the outcome of telling the truth (irrespective of the consequences of the lie). Sánchez-Pagés (2006) analyzes a truth-telling game where senders and receivers have conflicting goals, and observes that some subjects reject material incentives to misbehave. There is an open debate on the inner nature of lying costs, some scholars claiming that people have an inner aversion to telling lies (Vanberg 2008) , and others suggesting that people refrain from lying because they do not like to deceive others (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; . Hao and Houser (2010) provide experimental evidence to support the hypothesis that the only reason many people refrain from lying is to preserve their image of an honest person, but they willingly turn to lying when their action is hidden.
However, in their experiment too, about 44% of the subjects exhibit an intrinsic preference for honesty even under secrecy.
In this paper, we aim to study the inner mechanism of misleading communication in the negotiation context specific to the ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982) . In the standard experimental setup, the two players are often referred to as the Proposer and the Responder.
The Proposer is endowed with an amount of money and must make an offer as how to divide this sum between them. The Responder can accept the offer, in which case the endowment is divided as proposed, or reject it, in which case both players receive nothing. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with pure self-interest predicts that responders should accept any positive amount, and, knowing this, proposers should make close-to-zero offers. This result has been invalidated by an impressive number of tests (Roth, 1995) . As documented by Oosterbeek et al. (2004) in a meta-analysis covering 37 papers, on average proposers offer about 40% of the "pie"; also, about 16% of the offers are rejected. 2 These results have been interpreted as evidence of an inherent concern for fairness concern specific to human beings (Camerer, 2003) .
In order to allow the proposer to send misleading messages, we make sure that the responder has only imperfect information about the proposer's endowment. 3 The proposer is then asked to send a message indicating the amount of money received at the outset of the game; this is unverifiable information for the responder. The proposer's strategic advantage over the responder is thus twofold: he makes the first move and has full information about his position in the game. The responder's negotiation power stems from his ability to turn down the offer submitted by the proposer, at a cost for himself. We expect the responder to reject "unfair" offers; knowing this, the proposer should make offers that the former is likely to accept.
In the first part of the paper, we develop a simple message model in this ultimatum framework, building on the theoretical literature on strategic communication with lying costs (Kartik et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Kartik, 2009) . If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, we show that the others will claim that they received a smaller endowment simply to push down responders' expectations about this endowment and hence submit lower acceptable offers. The trade-off between lying costs and lying benefits is thus at the heart of the paper. In the second part of the paper, we implement an experiment where anonymous 2 See Bearden (2001) for an almost exhaustive survey of the literature on this game. 3 Many authors have studied ultimatum games with imperfect information, be it uncertainty or ambiguity (inter alia, Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993; Straub and Murnighan, 1995; Kagel et al. 1996; Güth et al., 1996; Rapoport and Sundali, 1996; Croson, 1996) . A standard result is that proposers make substantially lower absolute offers as compared to the perfect information case. pairs of subjects were asked to play the game described above four times. At the outset of a given round, the computer chooses the proposer's endowment from a uniform distribution; responders know this distribution. The proposers make an offer and send their message. The empirical results corroborate the theoretical model's predictions of proposers' behavior; the proposers understate the actual amount in 88.5% of messages (by 19% on average). However, the empirical evidence on responders' behavior challenges the theoretical model. On average, they base their accept/reject decision on the offer alone ignoring the message. As a result, the frequency of rejections, bringing about losses for both parties, is higher than in a truth-telling context. Probably one important contribution of this paper is to point out that, at least in this simple interaction, the "free-to-lie environment" is socially inefficient.
Our experiment -combining an ultimatum game with imperfect information and a message game -can be seen as an extension of the empirical study by Croson et al. (2003) . 4 In their paper, pairs of subjects play, four times, an ultimatum game with an outside option for responders if they reject the proposers' offer, under various information treatments.
In one treatment, proposers know the size of the pie (actually one of four possible values), while responders know that it can be anything between two given bounds (responders are thus subject to decision ambiguity). Croson et al. (2003) also allow for players to exchange messages and use a dummy variable to record a misleading/true message. In contrast to their study, in our experiment responders know the statistical distribution of the proposers' endowment; these amounts are drawn from an almost continuous distribution, an approach adopted by Rapoport and Sundali (1996) . Proposers' lies are measured by the difference between the declared and the actual amount, not by a dummy variable. We can therefore estimate the "subjective value" of a one-dollar lie, i.e. by how much on average a proposer reduces his offer each time he understates his endowment by one dollar.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a theoretical analysis of the lying strategy in an ultimatum game with imperfect information. Section 3 introduces the experiment. The last section presents the conclusion.
2 Theory: the "message game"
Main assumptions
In this section we aim at analyzing the communication strategy of a Proposer in an ultimatum game with one-side imperfect information. We consider a pair of players taken at random from a large population of individuals. Within a basic pair the two players will be referred to as the Proposer and the Responder. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume that individuals are identical in everything but their aversion to lying. Players aim to maximize their expected utility given their set of feasible strategies. In this simple model, we assume that -all things equal -players prefer more money to less, have fairness concerns, and present an aversion to lying, i.e. they dislike misrepresenting reality.
For an individual k, lying aversion is represented by a cost C k that the individual incurs whenever he tells a lie; following Lundquist et al. (2009) , we admit that this cost is proportional to the "size of the lie", i.e. the gap between the declared and the true value of the variable of interest; we can write the total cost as
is the marginal cost of one-dollar lie. There are two types players with respect to the lying cost. 5 Following the experimental evidence brought by Hurkens and Kartick (2009), Hao and Houser (2010) or Erat and Gneezy (2011) , we admit that a share α of the population is made of intrinsically honest individuals or "H-type players". For those players, the lying cost always exceeds the reward they can get from a false message M (in other words, c H is large enough). All other (1 − α) individuals have a marginal cost c L = c, with c small enough; they might consider the trade-off between bearing the cost of a lie (M < Y ) and the gain from making a lower offer Z. 6 We refer to these would-be liars as the "L-type players". Fehr and Schmidt (1999) argued that individuals in a position to compare their own gain with that of a reference group incurs an utility loss if their gain is below the average income of the group, what they call "disadvantageous inequality aversion", and can also bear an utility loss if they have a gain higher than the reference group, what they call "advantageous inequality aversion". They argue that an individual's sensibility to advantageous inequality aversion should be lower than the sensibility to disadvantageous inequality aversion. For the sake of simplicity, in this paper we assume that the two players in our ultimatum game are not sensible to advantageous inequality, i.e. they do not suffer an utility loss if they earn more than the other. We also admit that all subjects present the same aversion to disadvantageous inequality.
The ultimatum game is a two-player interaction. If we use the index k and −k to denote the two persons, and denote their payoffs by respectively x k and x −k , the utility function of individual k can be written as:
where For any given
In both cases, the utility is an increasing function in a player's own gain.
Strategies
For sure, for any player k, the game is acceptable if and only if U k (x k ) ≥ 0 :
Notice that in our setup only the proposer can issue a wrong message. Since the responder is not subject to the lie/tell-the-truth choice, the participation constraint for the responder can be written as:
Denoting by Y the total sum to be shared between the two players, with Y = x k + x −k , the responder's participation constraint can be interpreted as a fairness constraint: he will accept any offer x k providing him with a "fair share" of the pie:
Given that the responder does not know Y, his decision to accept or not the allocation will be based on his expected value of Y contingent upon the signal M issued by the proposer,
For a given strategy (M, Z) played by the proposer, the responder's optimal "pie-sharing strategy" will be:
Responder pie-sharing strategy
A proposer who aims at maximizing an utility function such as defined in Eq. (1) will make the smallest offer Z that the responder accepts, to get the largest gain (Y − Z). The best "pie sharing" strategy for the proposer is thus to offer the lowest acceptable amount by the responder:
Proposer pie-sharing strategy:
Given that E[Y |M ] ≤ Y and Φ < 0.5, it turns out that Z < (Y − Z) : the proposer is not subject to adverse inequality. The utility of a proposer utility who receives Y and plays his best pie-sharing is:
A proposer who aims to maximize his utility must decide on the message M that he sends to the responder, depending on his endowment Y and his type (honest or liar). A honest proposer will always declare the true amount (M = Y ) and a liar will declare a false amount
We admit that the optimal false message can be written as a (lying) function in
Proposers' communication strategy:
The lying function presents the following properties:
-g(0) = 0: if the endowment is zero, the message can be only zero (the proposer has no choice but to tell the truth);
since the message aims to push down the expected value of Y , and lies are costly, the proposer has no incentive to declare an endowment higher than the actual one; 8 -g admits a reciprocal function g −1 on the interval [0, A].
Equilibrium
Let us denote by f (M |L) (respectively f (M |H)) the conditional distribution of the signal M given that the proposer is a liar (and respectively a honest person). By application of Bayes' theorem for continuous distribution functions, the probability for the responder to be matched with a L-type proposer who issues a message M is:
In equilibrium, the responder should know the lying function g(M ); he can infer from the message M the conditional expectation of Y. If M exceeds g(A), this signal can only be true (it was sent by a H-type proposer). In the opposite case, if M ≤ g(A), the expected value of Y given M is :
an expression that acknowledges that M can be sent either by a honest player (then 
Thus the utility of the L-type proposer (Eq. 6) can be written as:
The optimal announcement strategy for a L-type proposer is to choose the message M that
This problem probably presents several equilibria, depending on responders' beliefs. In this paper we limit the analysis to the simplest (and also intuitively appealing) case where responders present linear beliefs:
Then g −10 (M ) = 1/µ and proposer's utility becomes:
The first order optimality condition:
leads to the optimal value, M . 9
The latter is a linear function of the endowment Y , consistent with responders' beliefs:
9 Wa can check that ∂ 2 U/∂M 2 < 0, ∀M.
Notice that, in equilibrium there is a single value of µ consistent with responders' beliefs, defined by:
This value exists iif c < Φ (existence condition). We can remark that µ = M/Y is increasing with c : the smaller the marginal lying cost and the higher the size of the lie.
Furthermore, the equilibrium requires: 0 < µ < 1 :
If this last condition is verified, the existence condition (c < Φ) is also fulfilled; thus the necessary and sufficient condition for this equilibrium to exist is:
The equilibrium with lies requires that the (1 − α) liars present a marginal cost of lying below the critical valuec. Notice that the solution also holds in the special case where liars present no lying aversion (c = 0). Individuals with a marginal lying cost abovec actually belong to the group of H-type proposers; such a person has no incentive to deviate from the truth-telling strategy, since the cost of lying would exceed its benefit from making a lower offer.
We recall that in this theoretical model agents differ only with respect to the (marginal) lying cost. We have shown that if there are at least some honest persons and for all the others lying costs are small enough (c <c), in equilibrium the latter will systematically understate Y, i.e. they declare M < Y. Responders adjust their beliefs in keeping with the message; in equilibrium they accept all offers. 10 Thus, compared with a no-lie (or a perfect information) environment, honest proposers who get Y < g(A) are worse-off since they must make higher offers, while liars are better-off, since they can make lower offers.
3 The Experiment
Experimental Design
In this section, we report on an experiment where we asked flesh and blood subjects to play an ultimatum game combined with a message game. The only difference with the theoretical model is that we set now a positive lower bound on the amount that can be provided by the computer. The main steps are listed below (see Appendix for instructions):
Step 1. Proposer gets Y experimental currency units. The endowment Y is picked by the computer with even chances among integers in the interval [50; 100].
Step 2 Step 3. He makes an offer Z (with Z ∈ [0; Y ]).
Step 4. Responder gets the message M and the offer Z. He must decide whether to accept or reject the offer. If he accepts, the amounts are due; if else, both players get nothing.
The whole procedure was common knowledge. We run three sessions. The first was per- answered to a call for paid decision experiments. The experimental design was presented via computer interface and all interactions were computerized. The program was written in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Each subject was assigned at random with a PC terminal.
We make sure that no subject has participated more than once in this experiment. A short introductory questionnaire allows to make sure that students understand well the problem.
The roles (proposer/responder) were assigned one for all at the outset of the game, but players were not informed of their role before each round started. Each proposer played the game four times against changing anonymous partners (Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993); we gathered a total of 148 observations (37 independent per round).
We randomly chose one of the four rounds to be paid for real money, at an exchange rate of 10 euro for 100 experimental currency units. 11 The test has lasted for 18 minutes on average, and players earned 4.80 euros (including a 2 euro fixed participation amount). 12
Results: Proposer behavior
Lying by understating the actual endowment Y appears to be the systematic behavior.
Proposers adopted this strategy in 88.5% of the overall 148 decisions. They told the truth in 8.8% of the cases, and the number did not vary much from one round to another. Subjects overstated the actual endowment in a very small number of cases (2.7%); this strategy does not fit well in our theoretical framework. Some misunderstanding of the problem might explain them, an assumption that seems to be vindicated by the declining number over the four rounds (from to 2 to 0). 13 If we consider all the messages (including true ones and overstatements), the average discount is 17.64%.
An examination of the data change from one round to another suggests that the learning effect is limited, if any. Except the decline in the almost very small number of "irrational lies" (Table 1) 
where i indexes the player, with i ∈ [1, 37] , and t indexes the round, with t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Parameter a captures the relationship between offers and endowment when controlling for the lie, the parameter b indicates the variation in the offer for a one-dollar lie. Denoting the common constant by c, the parameter θ t denotes a round-specific intercept and would capture any group learning effect over the rounds; to avoid colinearity, one round must be dropped (we choose the first one as the benchmark). The individual specific effect u i captures individual unobserved heterogeneity, and it is an indiosyncratic error. In a fixed effect (FE) specification u i are treated as constants over time, in a random effect (RE) model the u i are treated as random variables rather than fixed constants (furthermore, in the RE approach, u i and it are assumed to be independent). It is difficult to say which of the two methods fits best to our model; the RE specification is appealing since the individuals in our test are a small sample of a much larger population (of student subjects), the FE is interesting, since it is not clear why individual effects should be uncorrelated with the other regressors. We therefore provide in Table 4 an estimate of Eq. (22) Proba all u i = 0 0.00 - Table 4 . Proposer offer equation: Estimation output.
(*** stands for significant at 1%, ** stands for significant at 5%, ns for non significant) These findings are consistent with the theoretical model, according to which L-type proposers (i.e., those characterized by a relatively small marginal lying cost) would declare a smaller than actual endowment, just in order to prompt responders to reduce the expected endowment (of proposers) and make lower offers. Our results also match those put forward by Croson et al. (2003) who showed that in presence of imperfect information and lies, for every additional dollar endowment, proposers raise their offer by 39 cents. They also report that a lie (as measured by a dummy variable) would reduce the offer by 1.5 dollars. 15 Round specific effects are not statistically significant, suggesting that over a small number of repeated interactions the proposers' learning effect is limited. Table 5 indicates the basic statistics pertaining to the responder's decision. On average, the rejection rate at 24% is slightly higher than usual, but not excessive (Oosterbeek et al. 2004 refer to a rejection rate of 16% on average).
Results: Responder behavior
Over the total of 148 observations, the average amount of the accepted offers (29.04) is higher than the average amount of the rejected offers (21.88). A Mann-Whitney U-test for independent observations shows that the difference between the average of accepted offers and the average of rejected offers is significant at 5% in rounds 1, 3 and 4 (it is not significant in round 2).
The same test shows that the average declared endowment (Av. M ) in rejected offers is not statistically different from the average declared endowment in accepted offers in any of the four rounds. We also perform a regression of the decision dummy ARD (which takes the value 1 when the offer is accepted, 0 when rejected) on the offer Z and the declared endowment M :
where the index j corresponds to a Responder, and t indexes the round. As in the former regression, θ t denotes the round specific effect (to avoid colinearity we omit the first round), u j captures the individual heterogeneity and jt is the idiosyncratic error. Given the binomial nature of ARD we implement a probit and logit model, both of them with a random effect (RE) specification. The output is presented in Croson et al. (2003) : while the offer Z has a statistically significant impact on the probability to accept an offer, the message M has not. offer accepted increase by 3 percentage points for one-dollar increase in the offer Z.
In order to bring some additional intuition to these results, let us perform some rule-ofthumb calculations. We know that on average a six dollar lie reduces proposers' offer by one dollar (Table 4) , but this rises the probability of having the offer rejected by responders by 3 percentage points (Table 5) . We consider now a L-type proposer with a zero marginal cost of lying. Let us assume that he gets 75 dollars (the expected value of the uniform distribution over [50, 100] ), tells the truth and makes an offer Z = 0.33 * 75 = 25. 17 Given the average rejection rate, his expected payoff is (75 − 25) * 0.76 = 38. Now, if he tells a six dollar lie, he will reduce his offer by one dollar, from 25 to 24 dollars. For sure, if the probability of having the offer accepted does not vary, he would make a profit. But since for a smaller offer the probability to have it accepted declines by 3 percentage points, the expected gain will be (75 − 24) * 0.73 = 37.23. It turns out that in the neiborghood of these average values, a onedollar lie brings about an ex post dollar loss to the "unethical" proposer (without counting any would-be lying cost on top of it). These numbers suggest that in this game proposers are subject to a form of overconfidence bias: they tend to believe that responders will take for granted their message, but this does not happen.
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied an ultimatum game with uninformed responders and proposers who can communicate strategically about their endowment, knowing that the responders will not be able to verify their claim. The theoretical analysis presented in the first section suggests that while there are at least some honest people in this world, it is worth lying for the others.
More precisely, proposers willing to lie can be expected to understate the actual endowment 17 Here 0.33 is the average share offered by a honest person according to the estimated offer equation (Table  4) . and make lower offers.
The empirical findings corroborate the predictions of the theoretical model as far as the proposers are concerned. In 88.5% of the messages, proposers discount their endowment by 20.5% on average. These lies are systematically associated with lower offers; for every one-dollar lie, proposers reduce their offer by 19 cents. However, the experiment challenges the theoretical analysis as far as responders' are concerned since they do not react as the proposers expect: the endowments declared by proposers have little impact on their decision whether to accept/reject the offer. They behave as if the received message is genuine "cheap talk". Only the amount of the offer itself matters in their decision whether to accept/reject it: a one-dollar reduction in the offer reduces the acceptance rate by 3 percentage points.
If proposers reduce their offers because they "believe in their own lies", but responders are skeptical, the final outcome is a net welfare loss, since the frequency of rejected offers (bringing zero gains for both players) will be higher than in a lie-free environment. In this simple experiment, attempts to manipulate through lying are detrimental not only to those who receive the wrong message, but also to those who deliver it. Despite this, the people in a position to÷ lie do lie; they are probably victims of a self-confidence bias concerning their ability to cheat.
It is difficult to extend the insights from this simple game to any other form of selfish lies. However, if further research can show that lying systematically brings about a socially inefficient outcome, then the emergence of a social norm banning lying would appear as a natural outcome. It presents an interaction between two individuals on how to share a sum of money, denominated in ECU (for Experimental Currency Units) Individuals play in pairs, under complete anonymicity, behind the computer screen. Pairs are rematched at every round. You never play twice with the same player. Identities of the persons will never be revealed.
At the beginning of the game, one of the two players gets an endowment. He must then make an offer to the other on how to divide this amount between them. For instance, if he receives 100 ecus, he can make an offer 10, that is a division 90:10. Then the other player can either accept this offer or reject it. If accepted, the first player who made the offer keeps the 90 ecus and the second player who accepted the offer keeps the 10 ecus; if rejected, both players get nothing. Thus by giving up his own gain, the second player can inflict a loss to the former.
In this game, the player who receive the offer (Player 2), will never learn the exact amount received by the first player (Player1). He only knows that the amount is chosen by the computer, with equal chances, among the integers in the set [50, 100] .
Before making his offer, Player 1 must sent a message to Player 2, indicating the amount he got at that round. Player 2 cannot verify this information (and Player 1 knows this).
Screen 2. Some clarification questions
These questions aim at helping you to better understand the rule of the game, by means of some fictitious examples.
